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Abstract: In various professional standards and regulations, the 
accounting profession has generally described independence as a 
lack of specific interests and relationships that are presumed to 
affect auditor objectivity. An auditor must be watchful to any 
harmful impacts on his planning, investigation, or reporting to 
preserve independence under the numerous pressures from 
clients. This article reviews auditor independence literature and 
factors affecting independence in order to determine the effects of 
the factors on independence. The method employed for the 
research is a desk system of research design, in which data were 
collected through secondary sources such as journals, books and 
internet materials. The finding of the review indicates that the 
most mentioned threats to auditor independence are non-audit 
services, audit tenure, auditor-client relationship and client 
importance. Independence continues to be a problem when it 
comes to finding out how accurate and credible investor financial 
statements are. The leading factor of the independence of the 
auditor was not evident, but other researchers ranked them based 
on importance because of their belief that they chose to 
experiment. 
Keywords: Agency theory, Audit, Auditor independence, 
Threats.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
   The objective of this paper is to critically review the 
literature and theories related to the present study. It will also 
review several important concepts related to auditors’ 
independence as well as empirical studies that explain the 
relationships between auditor’s independence and factors 
affecting the independence of auditors. Independent auditing 
is a key characteristic of effective capital markets and 
regulatory authorities have been worried with potential threats 
to audit independence for a very long time (Defond, 
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 2002). The independence 
of the auditor is often defined as the possibility that the 
auditor will report a found breach in the financial reports 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983).  
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 Independence of auditors relates to the capacity of external 
auditors during their audit to behave with integrity and 
impartiality (Akpom and Dimkpah, 2013; Gul, 1991; Said 
and Khasharmeh, 2018). An independent auditor is required 
to audit accounts of the body corporates by statute, which 
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defines his responsibilities, rights and powers. Due to the 
separation of ownership from leadership in the organisations, 
it is crucial as the owners requires someone who can maintain 
a professional watch on the management and to whom they 
can trust the accuracy of accounts as the preparation of 
financial statements is the prerogative of the management. 
The auditor has little to suggest about the form and adequacy 
of the financial statement, and his report is the responsibility 
of the independent auditor. Independence is essential to 
auditors reports reliability (Salehi, Mansoury, and Azary, 
2009). 
However, the corporate scandals of the 2006 confirmed the 
significance of the autonomy of the auditor, and there is 
steady pressure from the press, shareholders, investors, 
regulators and all other stakeholders to improve their 
credibility. As many company giants such as Enron, 
WorldCom in the developed economy as well as Cadbury 
Nigeria plc and Lever Brothers plc in Nigeria have been 
associated with auditor independence problems 
(Abdul-Rahman, Benjamin, and Olayinka, 2017; Ruddock, 
Taylor, and Taylor, 2006), auditors independence is now 
more than ever a problem for stakeholders. This paper tries to 
review literature on auditor independence to come up with a 
finding. It is on this note that the researcher considers it 
possible to review appropriate literature to determine possible 
threats that may have any impact on the auditor’s 
independence. 
III. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
  This study's primary goal is to examine auditor 
independence literature to identify major prominent threats to 
auditors' independence as documented by different 
researchers using diverse techniques. 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 This article reviews empirical studies to evaluate what 
researchers have done about problems linked to auditor 
independence and identify literature gaps where further 
research is required. The method employed for the research is 
a desk system of research design, in which data are collected 
through secondary sources such as journals, books and 
internet materials. 
V.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The underpinning theory adopted in explaining the 
present study framework can be justified based on the agency 
theory.  
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The theory was adopted to provide the required theoretical 
foundation and explanation on the salient role of auditor’s 
independence. 
VI. AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory, in the views of De Angelo (1981), Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), José and Almeida (2014) and Panda 
and Leepsa (2017) suggest that, information asymmetries and 
conflict of interest between the agents and the principals 
should theoretically be able to regulate  behavior in an 
organization through directing and rewarding system. In other 
words, agency theory postulates that information asymmetry 
influences objective scrutiny of financial statements and 
agency problems. The principal-agent relationship is 
illustrated in agency theory which stipulates that the principal 
lack reasons to believe their agents because of information 
asymmetries and conflicting interest. Thus, information 
asymmetry during decisions making occurs when one party is 
more informed than the other party. The agency theory 
provides the theoretical underpinnings to support the position 
of auditors’ independence in bridging information asymmetry 
gap between principal and agent. 
 Similarly, contradictory aspects such as financial rewards, 
market opportunities, and associations with other parties, that 
are not directly related to principals can drive agents to be 
more optimistic about the economic performance of an entity, 
rather than the performance of the whole organization. 
Information asymmetries and opposing motivations decrease 
dependability of information, which resulted in the principals’ 
lack of trust on their agents. Therefore, auditors, as a third 
party, should try to align the interests of agents with 
principals, to let principals to measure and control the 
behavior of their agents and to increase principals’ confidence 
on agents that may negatively influence auditors independent 
(Colbert and Jahera 2017).  
VII. AUDIT 
 Audit refers to an activity to address information 
asymmetry and the gap between different parties and an 
organisation. It also plays a very crucial role in reducing 
agency costs, as well as in increasing shareholders and third 
parties’ confidence to the reliability of the financial 
information provided by the financial statements (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1983). Auditing is mainly about bringing 
transparency and accountability in the public and private 
sector (Oyebisi, Wisdom, Lawrence, Bibiana and Dorcas, 
2017). Furthermore, it performs the function of administering 
appropriate confidence towards the credibility and 
dependability of an organisation’s financial statements among 
the stakeholders (Gipper, Leuz and Maffett, 2015). To 
achieve these objectives, independence of the auditor is key. 
Through exhibiting the principle of independence “in fact” 
and “in appearance”, the opinion expressed in the financial 
statement will be valued by its users (Wilson, 2017). 
Moreover, an audit serves as a tool to ensure that public and 
private entities take responsibility and accountability in their 
duties. In short, an audit could enhance the accountability, 
transparency, equity and integrity in the activities of an 
organisation (Masood and Afzal 2016). 
VIII. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE  
 Auditor independence is the foundation of the auditing 
profession (Abu Bakar and Ahmad, 2009). Also, according to 
Independence Standard Board (2000) auditors independence 
is the freedom from those pressures and other variables that 
compromise an auditor's capacity to make unbiased audit 
choices or can reasonably be anticipated to compromise. 
 Opinion express by an Independent auditor boosts the 
confidence of investors in the reporting system, and further 
translate to an improved in capital markets efficiency  
(Naslmosavi, Sofian, and Saat, 2013). It has been globally 
acknowledged that auditors’ independence is the key in 
bridging information asymmetry gap between owners of 
entities and their agents (John and Chukwumerije, 2014; 
Mardiah and Erlina, 2012; Panda and Leepsa, 
2017). Auditors’ independence will ensure that auditor 
expresses independent opinions that are true and fair about the 
financial statements prepared by the management. Ndubuisi, 
Okeke, and Chinyere (2017) opine that, auditors’ 
independence reflects unbiased mental attitude in reporting a 
financial statement while other scholars argued that 
independence is the distinctive feature of the profession 
(Albeksh, 2017). Ali and Nesrine (2017) mentioned that 
auditors’ independence is based on two features, in fact, and 
in appearance. 
 Furthermore, Tepalagul and Lin (2015), Patrick et al. 
(2017) and Salawu (2017) opined that the main threats to 
auditors’ independence are client importance, non-audit 
services, auditor tenure, and client affiliation with audit firms. 
Chen, Li and Chi, (2016) and Rickett, Maggina and Alam 
(2016) suggested that auditor-client relationship could impair 
auditors’ independence. Similarly, Kyriakou and Dimitras 
(2018) and Quick and Schmidt (2018) revealed audit tenure 
as the threats to auditors’ independence. Moreover, in the 
views of Alnawaiseh  and Mahmoud (2015), threats to 
auditors’ independence include self-interest threat, 
self-review threat, advocacy threat, familiarity threat and 
intimidation threat.  
     Similarly, empirical research conducted by John and 
Chukwumerije (2012) on the perception of accountants on 
factors affecting auditor’s independence in Nigeria has shown 
evidence on the significant relationship between auditor’s 
independence and audit firm size, market competition, audit 
tenure, audit fees and non-audit services. Albeksh (2017) 
opined that independence could be categorised into objective 
and personal factors. Objective factors consist of audit size, 
audit market competition, audit firm tenure and non-audit 
services while the personal factors are qualification, integrity 
and secretariat, as well as objectivity and independence. 
          In contrast to the views of Kyriakou and Dimitras (2018) 
on mandatory audit firm rotation, Aschauer and Quick (2018) 
did not identify any significant effect of audit rotation on 
auditor independence. Their findings indicated that 
mandatory audit rotation does not have any significant 
negative influence on the level of perceived auditor’s 
independence. However, they agree with Tepalagul and Lin 
(2015) that the provision of non-audit services can impair 
auditors’ independence. 
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According to Roy and Saha (2016), auditors’ independence 
reflects the lack of personal interest by the auditor in the 
auditing engagement, and this can keep auditor away from 
any material bias which may affect the reliability and 
credibility of the financial statements for decision making. 
Thus, auditors’ independence is important because it could 
impact quality of reporting (Tepalagul and Lin, 2015). 
  Most of the empirical investigations on auditors’ 
independence falls within the four threats to independence of 
the auditor. These threats are, client’s importance, client’s 
affiliation with auditor firm, auditor tenure and non-audit 
services. Ali and Nesrine (2015) and Tepalagul and Lin 
(2015) categorized auditors’ independence into independence 
in fact and appearance. Independence in fact means that an 
auditor will act with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
demonstrate professional scepticism by not giving room for 
undue influence. Moreover, independence in appearance has 
to do with preventing third parties from reasonably conclude 
that the integrity, objectivity or professional scepticism of a 
firm or a member of the audit team have been compromised. 
Hence, it can be concluded that, in order to influence 
investment decision making, the provision of high quality 
financial reporting is essential (Albaqali and Kukreja 2017) 
IX. EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
  Al Nawaiseh and Alnawaiseh (2015), examined the effect 
of the threats on the auditors independence of mind and 
appearance, using descriptive statistics measurement and 
analytical statistics (paired samples test and one way ANOVA 
test to analyse the responses of 65 respondents representing 
37% of auditors who are registered in 189 auditing firms in 
Jordan to test the hypothesis of the study. The research found 
that, self-interest threats, self-review threats, familiarity or 
intimacy threats, advocacy threats and intimidation threats 
affect the auditor independence in mind and appearance.  
 Tepalagul and Lin (2015) carried out a comprehensive 
review of academic research pertaining to auditor’s 
independence and audit quality. Based on their review, 
concluded that, there is a limited evidence that auditors 
independence is compromised in the presence of client 
importance. Financial statement users generally perceive 
non-audit services as a threat to auditor independence. Their 
finding also conclude that auditing tenure does not impair 
independence. Furthermore, their findings show that only a 
few studies have examined the client affiliation threat and the 
evidence is mixed.  
 Patrick, Vitalis, and Mdoom (2017) reviewed literature on 
effect of auditor independence on audit quality. The review is 
ex post facto in nature where secondary data was employed. 
Their findings also revealed four threats to auditor 
independence, client importance, non-audit services, audit 
tenure and client’s affiliation with CPA firms. Furthermore, 
their findings discovered that some findings indicated a 
positive relationship while others showed contrary due to the 
type of study design employed, sample size, data collection 
instruments and analysis techniques used.  
  Salawu (2017) examined factors influencing auditor 
independence among listed companies in Nigeria using 
generalized method of movements (GMM) approach, with a 
sample of 65 firms out of the 194 listed on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange. These comprises of 14 money deposit banks, one 
mortgage bank and 50 non-financial firms. Secondary data 
was employed for the study and were sources from the audited 
financial reports of sample companies and fact book of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange between the period of 2006 to 2013. 
Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and 
generalized method of movements. The study revealed that 
Big4, audit tenure, profitability, leverage and inventory 
account receivable had negative significant impact, which can 
impair auditor independence. Furthermore, size of the firms 
and loss had positive influence on auditor independence in 
Nigeria.  
Enofe, Nbgame and Ediae (2013) examined the 
relationship between audit quality and auditors’ independence 
in Nigeria. A cross sectional study analysis of companies 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange was carried out. A 
sample of twenty (20) audited financial reports of these 
companies for the period ending 2011 was selected using the 
simple random sampling technique. The data collected for the 
variables were subjected to the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis. Findings indicated that as auditors‟ 
independence increases, the quality of audit also improves 
and as the independence of the board and ownership structure 
increases, the quality of audit reduces. 
Kyriakou and Dimitras (2018) studied impact of auditor 
tenure on audit quality in four European countries of 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain, using generalized method 
of movements (GMM) model during the period from 2005 to 
2013. Two GMM methods are used with two alternative 
definitions of crises-the main and the robustness method. The 
findings show that the impact of Spanish auditors’ long-tenure 
on discretionary accruals, affecting auditors’ quality and 
independence indirectly. 
Quick  Schmidt (2018) investigated whether perceptions 
of auditor independence and audit quality are influence by 
audit firm rotation, auditor retention and joint audits by 
conducting an experiment with bank directors and 
institutional investors in Germany. The result indicates a 
negative main effect for joint audit on perceived auditor 
independence. Also, beside the main effects, planned contrast 
tests suggest a negative interaction between rotation and joint 
audit on participant perceptions of auditor independence. 
Furthermore, the study could not identify a positive impact of 
the regulatory measures taken or supported by the European 
Commission on perceptions of auditor independence and 
audit quality. 
John and Chukwumerije (2012) examined factors 
affecting auditors independence in Nigeria. The study 
employed survey research design and data were collected 
using Likert-rated questionnaire, sampling 150 chartered 
accountants in 15 audit firms in Lagos, by random sampling. 
Analysis was carried out using descriptive statistics and 
chi-square in testing the hypothesis. Their finding shows that 
each of the factors of size of audit firm, audit market 
competition, audit firm tenure, size of audit fees and non-audit 
services has significant relationship with auditor’s 
independence. 
 Albeksh (2017) conducted research on factors affecting 
the independence of the external auditor within the auditing 
profession.  
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The findings revealed that the most important of the 
findings are auditing standards and professional behavior are 
the most impact factors on the independence of the auditor 
and that the integrity, honesty and truthfulness of the qualities 
that must be provided by the independent auditor. 
 Causholli, Chambers and Payne (2015) investigated the 
effect of selling non-audit services on auditor independence in 
America. Findings obtained from statistical regressions of 
abnormal accruals found strong evidence that the anticipated 
future provision of non-audit services does represent a source 
of impaired independence in the current year.  
 Aschauer and Quick (2018) examined mandatory audit 
firm rotation and prohibition of audit firm-provided tax 
services: evidence from investment consultants’ perception. 
Their study provides experimental evidence on effects of 
rotation system, the impact of non-audit services 
(auditor-provided tax services) and the interaction between 
both regulatory issues. Based on the assessment of 140 
professional investment consultants from credit institutions, 
their result shows that the provision of tax services by the 
audit firm decreases independence. 
 Roy and Saha (2016) studied statutory auditors’ 
independence in India: an empirical analysis from the 
stakeholders’ interest perspective. Their findings indicate that 
statutory auditors fail to detect irregularities in financial 
books due to their lack of independence and professional 
skepticism. Additionally, a long association between a 
statutory auditor and a client is one of the major reasons 
behind statutory auditors’ lack of independence. 
 Ali and Nesrine (2015) examined factors affecting auditors 
independence in Tunisia: the perceptions of financial 
analysts. Their study investigates the impact of 49 
independence enhancing and threatening factors on the 
perceptions of 54 financial analysts using questionnaire 
instrument. Their findings revealed that, the principal threats 
to independence are, provision of non-audit services and 
existence of personal and financial relationships. 
X. FACTORS AFFECTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF 
AUDITORS 
From the reviewed literature, the most prominent threats 
to auditor independence are, non-audit services, audit tenure, 
auditor-client relationship and client importance. Though 
there are others, but not as prominent as these ones that are 
single out. 
A. Non-Audit Services 
Auditors are attracted by the economic benefits to 
provide non-audit services to their audit clients as non-audit 
services are perceived to be more profitable (Tepalagul and 
Lin, 2015). However, the provision of non-audit services, 
such as tax services by auditors to client create high tendency 
for them to compromise their independence (Aschauer and 
Quick 2018; Tepalagul and Lin 2015).  Causholli et al. (2015) 
argued that auditors’ provision of non-audit services to their 
clients will create economic ties between them. In turn, this 
could decrease auditor’s independence. Similarly, Ye et al. 
(2006) are of the view that, the economic dependence 
occasioning from the provision of non-audit services 
(NAS) have been assumed to contribute to this attrition of 
auditor independence. 
      On the other hand, Aschauer and Quick (2018) stated that 
the provision of non-audit services to client by an auditor can 
be beneficial to the clients. Similarly, Causholli et al. (2015) 
believe that, the provision of non-audit services by auditors to 
their clients could increase auditors’ understanding of the 
client’s business, resulting in the desired audit outcome. Past 
studies also did not find any correlation between non-audit 
services and auditors’ tendency to issue a going concern, 
indicating that there is no conclusive link between the 
provision of non-audit services and the decrease in auditors’ 
independence (DeFond nd Zhang, 2014). Surprisingly, there 
is still no conclusive evidence to show that auditors’ provision 
of non-audit service to client can impair auditor 
independence. This is mostly because auditor’s desire to 
maintain their reputation and litigation cost outweighs the 
economic dependency on the clients. Loss of reputation and 
litigation costs, overshadowing the expected benefits from 
compromising auditor independence (Defond et al. 2002). 
B. Audit Tenure 
  The proponent of mandatory rotation argues that short 
audit firm tenure can strengthen auditor independence due to 
the avoidance of close personal relationship between the 
auditors and the client’s management (Dada 2018). Similarly, 
in a study carried out on audit firm rotation by Corbella et al. 
(2015), several countries presently have mandatory audit firm 
rotation guideline; Italy has required audit firm rotation since 
1975, Brazil since 1999, and Singapore has required audit 
firm rotation for local banks since 2002. Various other 
countries comprising Austria, Canada, Greece, Spain and 
Slovakia hitherto necessitated mandatory audit firm 
rotation.  Similarly, there are growing demands for audit 
committees to contemplate voluntary firm rotation as a means 
of improving audit quality. These calls for voluntary audit 
firm rotation presume that audit quality upsurges when a new 
audit firm is engaged (Türel et al. 2015).  
 However, Tepalagul and Lin (2015) argued that long 
tenure generally does not impair auditor independence, rather, 
the auditors will gain client-specific expertise as a result of the 
non-audit services provided, which mitigates the loss of 
knowledge due to audit firm rotation, and at the same time, 
minimises the economic incentives. Another study by 
Kyriakou and Dimitras (2018), which involved auditors in 
four European Union countries,  had also fail to discover any 
statistically significant relationship between long term tenure 
and auditors’ independence. This shows that non-rotation of 
auditors has no statistically significant influence on the audit 
quality as well as the auditor’s independence.        
  In a research conducted by Tobi et al. (2016) state that, 
audit firm rotation does not necessarily improve auditor 
independence in Nigeria. This could be due to the unity of 
professional stance among auditors and similarity in cultural 
bias and alignment may have momentous effect on the audit 
quality. Mandating audit firm rotation at the expense of other 
determining factors of audit quality would be a bad policy and 
may impair auditor independence, weaken audit expertise, 
undermine corporate governance and impair audit quality 
(Odia, 2015). 
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 The reasons for abandoning the requirements for 
mandatory audit firm rotation in Spain and Canada were 
related to its lack of cost-effectiveness, cost, and having 
achieved the objective of increased competition for audit 
services (Odia, 2015).  
C. Auditor-Client Relationship 
 Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt (2017) suggested that, 
measurement uncertainty alone does not influence auditor 
adjustments in the absence of social bonding. One way to 
ensure more conservative auditor evaluations of accounts 
with measurement uncertainty is to limit auditors’ 
social-bonding opportunities with their clients. Similarly, 
Tobi et al. (2016), applying the logistic regression model, 
their study findings shows that long-term auditor-client 
relationships is positively related with the increased 
likelihood of the auditor issuing an unqualified opinion. 
Furthermore, Aamir and Farooq (2011) suggested 
that,  long-term auditor-client relationship is essential for both 
the audit and the audit quality because auditor desires time so 
as to get to understand the client firm, its processes, its risks, 
and other procedures. This could be a good reason why an 
audit is challenging during the first year as compared to the 
successive years.  
     On the contrary, Wilson et al. (2018) observed that too 
much familiarity could retrogressively impact the 
performance of the audit team which in turn negatively affect 
auditor’s independence. According to Tobi et al (2016), a 
long audit-client relationship could lead to an alignment of the 
auditor’s interest and that of its client which makes truly 
independent behaviour of the auditor a probability. Similarly, 
the auditor-client relationship poses a risk to the objectivity 
and auditor independence that might lead to weakening audit 
quality, this is because auditor becomes more familiar, and 
closer to the client. Other opinions favour the view of 
diminishing audit quality because auditor becomes closer to 
clients and resulted in weakening the objectivity and auditor 
independence (Boone et al. 2008). This is because longer 
audit tenure leads to closer relationship between auditors and 
clients. The closer relationship may cause the auditor and the 
client to compromise their opinions concerning auditing and 
reporting method.  
 Importantly, Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt (2016) 
observed that, the social bond involves a relatively harmless 
aspect of auditor-client relationships, comparable to the 
casual interactions that real-world auditors and their clients 
experience on a day-to-day basis. That is, social bonds do not 
enforce economic burdens such as client retention or other 
conflicts of interest that would be akin to abuses of regulatory 
auditor independence rules. Herda and Lavelle (2013) suggest 
that auditors’ perceptions of client fairness are crucial in 
making robust auditor-client relationships. Deeper 
relationships generate more levels of service that go beyond 
the main audit requirements. 
D. Client importance 
 As economically important clients carry greater weight in 
an auditor’s portfolio, an auditor may have a higher incentive 
to yield to pressure from larger clients, thereby compromising 
independence (Tepalagul and Lin 2015). Similarly, Chen et 
al. (2016) states that, client importance is negatively 
associated with audit quality. Furthermore, Cahan and Sun 
(2015) carried out research on personal characteristics of 
audit partners by considering the incremental effects of client 
importance among others after controlling for overall audit 
experience. The results suggest that the auditors’ personal 
characteristics may serve as a signal of the level of care that 
will be exercised during the audit process. Also among the 
threats to auditors independence in a study conducted on 
effect of auditors independence on audit quality by Patrick et 
al. (2017) is client importance. 
 Chen et al. (2016) state that, after selecting sampling 8551 
firm-year observations discovered that client importance is 
negatively significant with incidences of audit adjustment, 
suggesting that greater client importance is connected with 
fewer audit adjustments, i.e. compromised audit quality. 
Likewise, economically a one-unit increase in client 
importance is correlated with a 1.3% decrease in the 
possibility of an audit adjustment, thus indicating that client 
importance has a negative impact on audit quality. 
Specifically, increased client importance means a decreased 
likelihood of adjusting for management bias on financial 
reports. These findings indicate that auditors may 
compromise their independence and sacrifice audit quality if 
it means retaining the client Chen et al. (2016).  
XI. CONCLUSION 
 Findings from the reviewed literature shows that, though 
there are quite a number of factors impairs auditor’s 
independence, the most mentioned among researchers are 
non-audit services, audit tenure, auditor-client relationship 
and client importance. Independence of auditors is very 
crucial to financial statement users. The more independent an 
auditor seems to be, the more confident investors and other 
stakeholders will have in his work and opinion. 
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